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Abstract—Accidents on petroleum installations can have huge 
consequences; to mitigate the risk, a number of safety barriers 
are devised. Faults and unexpected events may cause barriers to 
temporarily deviate from their nominal state. For safety reasons, 
a work permit process is in place: decision makers accept or re-
ject work permits based on the current state of barriers. Howev-
er, this is difficult to estimate, as it depends on a multitude of 
physical, technical and human factors. Information obtained 
from different sources needs to be aggregated by humans, typi-
cally within a limited amount of time. In this paper we propose 
an approach to provide an automated decision support to the 
work permit system, which consists in the evaluation of quantita-
tive measures of the risk associated with the execution of work. 
The approach relies on state-based stochastic models, which can 
be automatically composed based on the work permit to be exam-
ined. 
Keywords—safety analysis; barriers; petroleum; risk 
evaluation; model-based. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Petroleum installations are complex socio-technical sys-
tems where accidents can have major impact on life, health and 
the environment; furthermore, they can lead to huge economic 
losses. On the other hand, unnecessary interruption of opera-
tions would have a strong economic impact as well. For this 
reason, petroleum installations are subject to frequent work 
activities, to be undertaken during normal system operation. 
Work activities include maintenance operations, periodic veri-
fication of equipment, but also routine work operations. Fre-
quently, the execution of an activity is subject to safety threats, 
for example when handling hazardous materials (e.g., flamma-
ble materials). 
To mitigate the risk of accidents, a number of countermeas-
ures, called safety barriers, are devised and implemented 
across the entire system. Collectively, safety barriers constitute 
the “barrier system”, a complex (socio-technical) system whose 
behavior depends on a multitude of physical, technical, and 
human factors. In fact, barriers may consist of physical compo-
nents (e.g., gas detectors), software, procedures, trained hu-
mans, and basically everything that may contribute to risk re-
duction. 
Among these, a central role is played by the work permit 
process [3], which prescribes that work on installations can be 
carried out only if a specific written authorization (work per-
mit) has been released. Deciding whether to release or not a 
certain work permit is a complex decision, which requires tak-
ing into account different aspects, including the kind of work, 
possible conflicting work in the same area, as well as the cur-
rent state of the safety barriers that are relevant for that work. 
Furthermore, barriers are subject to faults, and understanding to 
which extents they are able to perform as intended is funda-
mental. Such decisions are taken by humans, and often need to 
be taken within a limited amount of time. Supporting tools for 
this process are so far limited, which means that decision mak-
ers have to aggregate the information gathered from different 
sources and conclude, based on their expertise, whether author-
izing a certain work would be “sufficiently” safe or not. 
In this paper we propose a methodology to support the 
work permit decisions process in the petroleum domain. The 
approach we propose is to compute quantitative measures ori-
ented to the evaluation of the risk associated with the execution 
of a certain work, using stochastic state-based models. Devel-
oping a decision support system will allow operators to have 
aggregate and objective information at their disposal, thus be-
ing able to take informed decisions, and document the motiva-
tions behind them. It should be noted that we are addressing a 
different problem with respect to safety cases, which serve a 
different purpose, and should hold for very long time. Con-
versely, the problem we address is evaluating the short-term 
risk associated with executing specific actions on installations. 
The paper is organized as follows. The problem we tackle 
is detailed in Section II, in which we introduce the work permit 
system and current challenges. Related work is discussed in 
Section III. Our model-based approach and the information it 
requires are illustrated in Section IV; the defined model library 
is presented in details in Section V. The application to a simple 
case study is then reported in Section VI, while in Section VII 
we discuss on the plans for automation and integration of the 
proposed steps. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII. 
II. SAFETY PROCEDURES IN THE PETROLEUM DOMAIN 
A. The Work Permit System 
A central task to ensure safety on petroleum installations is 
to coordinate work, in order to avoid conflicts and ensure that 
potentially risky work is not initiated unless appropriate coun-
termeasures, called safety barriers, are in place. For example, if 
in a certain area gas detectors are in a degraded state due to 
overdue maintenance, then hot work such as welding should 
not be allowed in that area, unless appropriate compensating 
2 
measures are in place. This is enforced by the “work permit” 
system, which should ensure safe execution and coordination 
of work on installations [3].   
Workers that need to perform non-routine work on an in-
stallation have to apply for a work permit (WP), by filling out a 
standardized form [3]. Every 12th hour, decision makers hold a 
meeting to go through all incoming WP applications for the 
next 12 hours, and decide which ones to release (accept) and 
which ones to reject. The number of WP applications can be 
high, meaning that the time available for each decision is lim-
ited. Making the right decision requires a good understanding 
of the current state of safety barrier systems, which may consist 
of many different parts and components, possibly having com-
plex interactions.  
 Which system components are involved, and how they con-
tribute to the safety of work execution depends on a combina-
tion of: i) the cyber and physical architecture of the system, ii) 
the specifics of the work to be authorized, described in the WP, 
and iii) the current state of system components. Among all the 
aspects that decision makers have to take into account, infor-
mation about deviations of safety-related components from 
their nominal state are of primary importance. This includes, 
for example, components that are overdue for periodic mainte-
nance, errors detected but not yet fixed, and so on. This kind of 
information is typically collected during system operation, and 
stored in a “deviations database”. To take a properly informed 
decision, decision makers need to identify, extract and aggre-
gate all the relevant information in order to assess the overall 
state of the barriers.  
This is a very difficult task, which is made even more diffi-
cult by the impact of subjectivity and possible human errors. 
For this reason, automated decision support, integrated into a 
computer-based WP system, has been theorized as a welcome 
improvement to the WP process, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The 
process starts with the applicant submitting the WP application 
to the WP system; the application is then presented to the deci-
sion maker at the appropriate time. Based on the specific in-
formation provided in the application, the WP system checks 
the status of relevant safety barriers, aggregates the obtained 
information and provides, along with the WP, some quantita-
tive metrics related to the risk of executing that work. Optional-
ly, if the system estimates that the state of barriers is unsatis-
factory with respect to some predefined threshold, then it issues 
a warning accompanied by an explanation, which is notified to 
the decision maker.  
It is then up to the decision maker to finally decide whether 
to release or reject the WP. The decision is issued to the WP 
system and forwarded to the applicant, as illustrated by the two 
alternatives of the "alt" construct at the bottom of the diagram. 
We emphasize that the decision maker is ultimately responsible 
for the decision and will typically consider not only the warn-
ing (or absence of warning) from the WP system, but also addi-
tional knowledge that may not be available to the automated 
decision support system, e.g., the expertise of workers. 
B. Challenges and Success Criteria 
Realizing a complete decision support system as described 
above requires a number of challenges and gaps to be ad-
dressed. In the following we summarize the main challenges 
that we identified, and discuss the ones that we aim to address 
with our proposal. 
The first challenge consists in being able to accurately per-
form run-time monitoring on all the safety-relevant aspects of a 
complex system like a petroleum installation. This includes 
keeping all the data in a well-organized and efficient database, 
and ensuring that stored information does not become outdated. 
Deciding which variables to monitor, and the acquisition inter-
val is also an important challenge. We do not address this as-
pect, and assume (as it is the case) that monitoring facilities are 
put in place by the owner of the infrastructure. 
The kind of input that should be processed by the WP sys-
tem introduces additional complexity. Although standard forms 
have been established [3], a work permit application is to a 
large degree constituted by free text, which should somehow be 
interpreted by the WP system. This aspect is also not addressed 
here: we assume that the information we need is available in a 
structured way in the WP application. Such information can be 
extracted via language processing techniques, or simply by 
using a structured format for WP applications. We believe that 
this will happen as operators switch from paper-based to com-
puter-based work permit systems. The work in this paper was 
inspired by cooperation with software providers currently pio-
neering this development. 
The aggregation of the information contained in the data-
base, and in the WP application, is also a great challenge. Syn-
thetic indicators need to be devised, so that the decision maker 
has an immediate understanding of the current state of the sys-
tem. The decision maker should be able to understand the se-
mantic behind the aggregated metrics, but he/she should be 
alleviated from understanding how they have been computed, 
which may involve the application of complex techniques. The 
approach we introduce in this paper addresses this challenge 
using quantitative safety metrics and state-based stochastic 
models. 
A final aspect to be considered is the high variability of dif-
ferent scenarios that the WP system should be able to address. 
The impact of faults, their propagation, and the way in which 
they impair the safety barriers is very variable, based on the 
kind of WP which is being requested. Different WPs may ap-
 
Fig. 1. WP system with decision support. 
3 
ply to different areas of the system and different kind of works; 
different conditions of the system may further introduce varia-
bility. The approach proposed in this paper addresses this prob-
lem by defining a set of template SAN [11] submodels that can 
be combined in different ways to automatically evaluate differ-
ent scenarios. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Approaches for the evaluation of safety properties in the 
petroleum domain have been introduced in the literature. How-
ever, none of them have been universally adopted by the indus-
try. 
The BORA-Release method [4] is designed specifically for 
barrier and operational risk analysis of hydrocarbon releases. It 
addresses a full risk analysis process and therefore it has a 
broader scope than our approach. One of the steps of the pro-
cess consists of modeling the performance of safety barriers, 
which is performed using fault trees. With respect to fault-
trees, state-based stochastic models like those used in this pa-
per allow more detailed behaviors to be modeled (e.g., failure 
propagation, time-related aspects). At the same time, we be-
lieve that our approach provides an alternate solution for the 
modeling of safety barriers that could be plugged into the 
BORA-Release method. 
Røed et al. [5] propose an interesting approach for the anal-
ysis of risk on petroleum installations. Their approach allows 
some parts of the risk assessment to be addressed using fault 
trees, while other parts are addressed using Bayesian belief 
networks. Hybrid casual logic is then applied to analyze the 
barriers in terms of probability of barrier failure. However, 
there are fundamental differences in the way barriers are mod-
eled; for example, our approach is able to take into account the 
temporal dimension. Furthermore the authors state that their 
technique is resource intensive.  
Other approaches, like ours, are geared towards a model-
driven approach. The work in [9] introduces an approach for 
the safety analysis of socio-technical systems, based on failure 
logic analysis techniques. The approach is applied to a case 
study in the petroleum domain. The authors of [10] introduce 
an approach for compositional risk modeling, through a notion 
of risk model encapsulation, for which internal details of a risk 
model are hidden. This is achieved by defining a risk model 
interface that contains all and only the information that is need-
ed for composing the individual risk models to derive the over-
all risk picture. However, the focus of those papers is mainly 
on the modeling aspects; also, they do not address techniques 
for quantifying the risk, but only perform qualitative analyses. 
The approach we propose in this paper is based on stochas-
tic state-based models. State-based stochastic models have 
been widely adopted in the literature on dependability and per-
formance analysis [7][25], also in combination with simulative 
and experimental measurement approaches [23]. Traditionally, 
such techniques have been applied for the analysis of specific 
problems, in which the system architecture was almost fixed. 
Successively, as system became more complex, the need for a 
different perspective arose, leading to techniques to automati-
cally derive analysis models from more abstract system de-
scriptions. This research direction is still active, today mostly 
focusing on the UML language [8]. 
In an effort to improve the extent to which state-based 
models can be reused, much like ordinary “components”, dif-
ferent authors have recognized the benefits of applying modu-
larization and “separation of concerns” [12] to the construction 
of state-based stochastic models. In such approaches (e.g., see 
[13][14][15][22]) the overall analysis model is built out of 
submodels addressing specific aspects of the systems, and hav-
ing well-defined interfaces. Such submodels are then composed 
following predefined rules based on the actual scenario to be 
represented. The authors of [16] further elaborated on this con-
cept, defining an approach in which SAN models extracted 
from model libraries are composed together, by model-
transformations, based on semi-formal specifications of the 
scenario to be represented. The approach we propose in this 
paper falls in this category, as it is based on a library of models 
that can be automatically assembled to represent different sys-
tem configurations. Such versatility helps in coping with the 
complexity of the safety barriers and the variability of WP ap-
plications. 
IV. MODEL-BASED APPROACH FOR WP PROCESSING 
A. The Methodology 
State-based stochastic models are a valuable tool for con-
structing the “warning” messages of Fig. 1: they are able to 
take into account complex interactions and dependencies, and 
aspects related to time and probabilistic behavior. By applying 
model-based evaluation [7] on a model of the safety barriers 
that are relevant to the work permit under examination, specific 
safety-related metric could be evaluated, and a warning mes-
sage generated if they fall below a predefined threshold. 
However, we need to construct the model based on the in-
formation present in the WP. The approach we propose as-
sumes to have at its disposal: i) a library of architectural mod-
els of barriers, specifying components and interconnections, as 
well as the unwanted events that need to be avoided; ii) a li-
brary of “template” SAN models, specifically created for the 
WP problem; and iii) a database in which information on the 
current state of the installation is stored. As mentioned in Sec-
tion II, the latter is typically in use in current practice already. 
The high-level view of the proposed approach is illustrated 
in Fig. 2. The workflow takes as input a WP application, and 
provides as output a decision on whether the WP should be 
released (accepted) or rejected. A preliminary step consists in 
analyzing the WP application, in order to retrieve the infor-
mation that is relevant to the decision process. This includes 
identifying the relevant characteristics of the WP, e.g., the kind 
of work and the areas in which it will be undertaken, and con-
sequently the safety barriers that are relevant to that WP appli-
cation. The effort required to perform this activity depends on 
the actual representation of the WP form that is adopted by the 
company. In case of a strongly structured representation (e.g., 
semi-formal languages, XML, etc.), information can be directly 
retrieved from the WP. If it is not the case, a WP Analysis step 
is performed to extract the required information. In this paper 
we assume that the needed information, consisting in the Rele-
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vant Barriers and the Relevant WP Characteristics has already 
been extracted from WPs. 
Following the application, the information extracted from 
the WP is processed by the Templates Selector module (1), 
which, based on the architectural models of the involved barri-
ers and on the specificities of the WP, identifies the template 
models that need to be retrieved from the model library, and 
how they should be interconnected. The complete composite 
model for evaluating the WP request of interest is then assem-
bled by the Model Composer module (2).  
The next step is to evaluate the model and obtain the nu-
merical results for the metrics of interest (3). Such results are 
then presented, possibly accompanied by warning messages, to 
the decision maker (4), which then ultimately decides whether 
to release the WP or not. Before taking the final decision, 
he/she can request additional evaluations of the model, for ex-
ample to perform sensitivity analysis on some key parameters 
or to perform “what-if” analysis with respect to conditions that 
are judged to be particularly critical. 
In this paper we focus on the key steps 1 and 2 of the work-
flow, and then provide an application to a simple use case, 
which also shows a possible execution of steps 3 and 4. 
B. Barriers Architectural Models 
As a prerequisite to the execution of step 1, we assumed to 
have at our disposal a library of architectural models of barri-
ers. These models are created and maintained by collaboration 
between petroleum domain experts and safety experts. Each of 
those models describes one or more events to be avoided 
and/or detected, the chain of events that may cause them, and 
possible barriers that prevent such events from propagating. 
Ideally, those models need to be updated only rarely; in such 
occasions, their consistency and adherence to reality are thor-
oughly verified. 
The actual language used to model barriers is a choice that 
is related to technical details, and to preferences of individual 
companies. We do not pose restriction on the language that is 
adopted for modeling barriers: at this level we are only inter-
ested in the information that should be available, which con-
sists in the following:  
• The events of interest for that barrier (i.e., events that 
the barrier is meant to prevent or detect). Events have an 
occurrence probability distribution. 
• The components that are part of the barrier. Component 
is here intended in a broader sense, also considering 
human and organizational entities as in [9]. Components 
are affected by internal faults, which occur with a given 
fault occurrence probability distribution, and by exter-
nal faults, which are caused by other components [1]. A 
component can have one or more failure modes, which 
are caused by different combination of internal and ex-
ternal faults. 
• How component failures propagate, i.e., how the failure 
of a component affects components that depend on it or 
communicate with it. More precisely, which failure 
modes of a component induce which external faults of 
components that depend or communicate with it. Possi-
bly, propagation may occur after some delay.  
• How events propagate/escalate, i.e., how they combine 
to form a new event. Propagation of an event may be 
immediate, if the event is a direct consequence of a 
combination of events, or after a time specified by an 
occurrence probability distribution. 
• Components able to block the propagation of events, if 
any. Some components of the barrier, when working 
correctly, are able to block the propagation of events. 
Some of them are consumable, meaning that can be 
used only once (or a limited number of times). It is the 
case for example of fire extinguishers. 
• Components able to detect events, if any. Some compo-
nents of the barrier may be able to detect events occur-
ring in the installation. The extent to which they are able 
to do this depends on their working conditions. We dis-
tinguish between timely detection of events, and late de-
tection of events, i.e., detection that occurs after some 
predefined time constraint. 
• The set of metrics of interest for that barrier. Possible 
metrics are related to the likelihood of occurrence of po-
tential incidents: i) the probability of occurrence of an 
event; ii) the probability of not detecting an event on 
 
Fig. 2. Workflow of the proposed methodology for building a decision support WP system. 
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time, iii) the probability of not detecting an event at all; 
iv) the probability that a given combination of compo-
nent failures occur. Each barrier model specifies the ex-
act metrics that are relevant for that barrier. 
Such information needs to be represented in a structured 
way, and stored in a library, in order to be processed by the 
Template Selector module. Suitable languages include UML 
[21], but also simpler representations like XML documents. 
C. Work Permit Request  
We then need to identify which of the information present 
in a WP application is of interest for our approach. We based 
our inspection on the standardized WP forms provided as ap-
pendix to [3]. There exist two kinds of WP forms: Level 1 and 
Level 2 forms, based on the risk associated to the work to be 
executed. Where not specified otherwise, the following list 
applies to both WP levels. 
Date and time. Basic information of the WP request con-
tains the date and time of execution of the work, in the fields 
“Date”, “From hour” and “to hour”. This information is im-
portant in order to retrieve up to date parameters from the data-
base, and to know the interval of time in the future for which 
metrics should be predicted.  
Kind of work. The kind of work that will be performed is 
specified by the “Work description” field. For a Level 1 WP, 
additional checkboxes are used to precisely state if specific 
kinds of dangerous work (e.g., pressure testing) will be per-
formed. The kind of work contributes to the identification of 
risks associated to its execution, and consequently of the safety 
barriers that need to be in operation. 
Location. The location of the work is precisely identified by 
a number of fields: “Installation”, “Location/module”, “Deck” 
and “Zone”. The precise location allows risks associated to the 
location to be identified (e.g., failed components), and also to 
identify possible conflicting work to include in the evaluation. 
Risks. A specific “Identified risks” section of a WP applica-
tion contains a description of the risks associated with the 
work. This includes a description of the hazards that may be 
generated by the work, the accidents that may occur, and which 
measures should be implemented in order to mitigate the iden-
tified risk. The information in this field is used to identify the 
events that must be avoided, i.e., those whose probability of 
occurrence will be estimated. 
Required operations and safety measures. Based on the 
kind of work and associated risks, the applicant also fills a sec-
tion to indicate which are, in his/her experience, the required 
operations and safety measures to be established. This includes, 
for example, preventing the release of oil/gas in the area, the 
use of fire extinguishers, and the periodic measurement of gas 
levels. The information in this field contributes to the selection 
of barriers to be included in the analysis model. 
Isolation of safety systems. In this section it should be spec-
ified if the execution of the work requires disconnecting some 
safety system, in which area of the installation, and which are 
the needed countermeasures. This constitutes important infor-
mation not only in relation to the WP under examination, but 
also in relation to other work that is concurrently ongoing or 
planned in the same area.  
D. Data Repository 
The last element that we use as source of information is a 
data repository where information about the installation and its 
components is stored, obtained from monitoring, historical 
data, or datasheets. In a typical installation, the information that 
can be stored in such a repository is huge. In this paper we as-
sume to know at least the following information, which is 
mostly available in current practice already: 
• Failure rates or failure distributions of components, ob-
tained from datasheets or historical data. 
• Relative occurrence of different failure modes of com-
ponents, obtained from datasheets or historical data. 
• Occurrence rates or distributions of events, obtained 
from historical data or experts’ judgment. 
• Time of last repair/installation/verification of compo-
nents. 
V. ANALYSIS MODELS TEMPLATES 
The above information should drive the construction of the 
stochastic analysis model from a set of reusable submodels 
having predefined interfaces and parameters. Such submodels, 
created using the SAN formalisms, are organized in a library, 
from which – on demand – they are instantiated multiple times 
and connected together to model the scenario concerning the 
WP under examination. Templates constituting the library, and 
how they are interconnected, are described in this section. 
A. Template Models 
The library includes 8 templates: EventOccurrence, Even-
tRecovery, ConditionChecker, GenericComponentGeneric-
Component, Detector, ConsumableBarrier, Disabler, Timeline. 
Each of these templates models a key aspect among those in-
troduced in the previous sections; when combined together, the 
behavior of whole barriers can be represented.  
The adopted formalism is Stochastic Activity Networks 
(SAN) [11], an extension of Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) [2]: 
places (represented as circles) can contain tokens; the number 
of tokens in all places is the state of the model. Tokens are 
added or removed by the firing of activities (represented as 
vertical bars), which may be immediate or timed. Input gates 
and output gates (represented as triangles) allow complex pre-
conditions and consequences to be specified for the execution 
of activities. Further information on the SAN formalism can be 
found in [11]. When it is not specified otherwise, we do not set 
constraints on the probability distribution of timed activities. 
Interface places, i.e., those that are meant to be shared with the 
other subnets, are highlighted with a dashed box in the follow-
ing figures. 
1) EventOccurrence 
The EventOccurrence subnet (Fig. 3) models the occur-
rence of a generic event related to the platform. For example, 
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this subnet can be used to model dangerous events like gas 
leakage or modifications of weather conditions. 
 
Fig. 3. EventOccurrence subnet. 
The preconditions for the occurrence of the event are repre-
sented by the Precondition place, which contains a token only 
if the needed preconditions are not satisfied. The actual occur-
rence of the event is modeled by the firing of the Event activi-
ty; the occurrence of the event normally does not modify its 
preconditions, i.e., tokens are not removed from the Precondi-
tion place. A token is added to the EventOccurred place. 
Two additional places, DetectedOnTime and DetectedLate 
are associated with each event, and are used to keep track of 
whether an event has been detected or not, and if it has been 
detected on time or late (with respect to an appropriate deadline 
for its detection). 
2) EventRecovery 
Recovery from the occurrence of an event is modeled by 
the EventRecovery subnet (Fig. 4). In general, this means that 
the immediate effects caused by the event have been removed. 
For example, the gas leakage has been stopped, or a good 
weather condition was restored. 
 
Fig. 4. EventRecovery subnet. 
Also the recovery requires the existence of a precondition, 
which is modeled by the RecoveryPossible place. Only when 
such place contains a token the Recover activity is enabled. 
When the Recover activity fires, all tokens in places Even-
tOccurred, DetectedOnTime, and DetectedLate are removed.  
It should be noted that the precondition for the execution of 
a recovery event may also be the occurrence of another event. 
In this case, the EventOccurred place of the second event is 
shared with the RecoveryPossible place of the event for which 
recovery is being modeled.  
3) GenericComponent 
The subnet for modeling a generic component is depicted in 
(Fig. 5). A component may be affected by a certain number of 
different failure modes, which may be caused by internal faults, 
external faults, or a combination of both.  
The occurrence (and activation) of an internal fault is repre-
sented by the FaultOccurrence activity. With a certain proba-
bility, the activation of the fault may generate different errors 
in the component, each one represented by an ErrorX place. In 
the example in the figure three errors are shown; the actual 
number depends on the concrete component to be modeled.  
 
Fig. 5. GenericComponent subnet. 
Failure modes of the component are modeled by a set of 
FailureModeX places, which contain a token if that specific 
failure mode has occurred, and are the interface of the subnet 
with the other models. The component may be affected by ex-
ternal faults, represented by the ExternalFaultX interface plac-
es. These places are shared with FailureMode places of other 
components, or with EventOccurred places of events that are 
external faults for the component (e.g., the occurrence of an 
electric shock). As a particular kind of external fault, the Disa-
bled place contains a token when the component is explicitly 
disabled during the work, e.g., for work that includes the “iso-
lation of safety systems” [3]. 
The occurrence of component failures is given by a combi-
nation of external faults, errors, and the disabling event. The 
condition is encoded in the IGFailure input gate associated 
with the Failure activity. The firing of this activity ensures that 
the marking of the FailureModeX places is always consistent 
with the current state of the component. We assume that the 
effect of errors and external fault is immediate: we do not con-
sider propagation delays. This is mainly due to the fact that 
information on the system is limited, and such delays would be 
difficult to estimate. Still, in case a delay needs to be modeled, 
it can be represented using the EventOccurence subnet. 
Repair of the component is modeled by the Repair activity, 
which is enabled and fires when a token is in DoRepair place. 
To ensure a correct modeling of the repair, the FaultOccur-
rence activity is reactivated (i.e., a new value is sampled from 
its distribution) when a token is in DoRepair. 
4) ConditionChecker 
For several reasons it may be necessary to test specific con-
ditions on the state of the overall system. For example, a pre-
condition for the execution of an event may be satisfied only if 
a specific combination of other events has occurred. 
This kind of check is performed by means of the Condi-
tionChecker subnet (Fig. 6). This subnet has a set of places as 
input, each of them representing one of the basic conditions to 
be checked (e.g., the occurrence of some event, or the failure of 
a component). The place Condition holds one token if the con-
dition to be checked is true, otherwise it is empty. The objec-
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tive of this subnet is to ensure that the number of tokens in the 
Condition place is always consistent with the result of evaluat-
ing the specified condition on the InputX places. 
 
Fig. 6. ConditionChecker subnet. 
The condition to be checked is encoded in the IGCheck in-
put gate, which ensures that the number of token in place Con-
dition is consistent with the state of the places considered as 
input of the subnet. If it is not the case, then Check fires and the 
execution of the IGCheck gate reestablishes the consistency. 
5) Detector 
Event detection is modeled using the Detector subnet (Fig. 
7), which interfaces with the event that it is meant to detect, 
through the interface places EventOccurred, DetectedOnTime, 
and DetectedLate.  
 
Fig. 7. Detector subnet. 
The actual detection is modeled by the Detection activity, 
which may have three outcomes: the event is detected within a 
predefined time bound; the event is detected late; the event is 
not detected at all. The relative probabilities of the three corre-
sponding cases are a parameter of the template. Place OneShot 
ensures that the activity fires only once per event occurrence. 
When the reference event is cleared (i.e., place EventOccurred 
becomes empty), then a token is restored in the OneShot place 
by the firing of the Reset activity. 
In case the detection activity relies on some specific com-
ponent of the barrier system, then the subnet is connected to the 
corresponding GenericComponent subnet, by means of the 
Disabled interface place, and the FailureModeX places. The 
content of these places may influence the firing of the Detec-
tion activity and/or the relative probabilities of its cases.  
6) ConsumableBarrier 
Some safety barriers may be consumable, i.e., they may be 
used only once and need to be replaced after their use. It is the 
case for example of fire extinguishers. This aspect is modeled 
by the ConsumableBarrier model (Fig. 8). The model contains 
two instantaneous activities, Block, which represents the appli-
cation of the consumable barrier, and Propagate, which repre-
sents the propagation of the incoming event, due to the deple-
tion of the consumable barrier items. 
 
Fig. 8. ConsumableBarrier subnet. 
The number of consumable items is stored in place Barrier-
Items, and it is progressively diminished every time the Block 
activity fires. The Disabled place represents the disabling of 
this barrier. In case the consumable barrier explicitly refers to a 
component of the system, the BarrierItems is connected with 
the Healthy place of the corresponding subnet.  
7) Disabler 
Disabling of a component is modeled using the Disabler 
subnet (Fig. 9). The Disabled place is shared with the corre-
sponding place in the subnet to be disabled, while Disa-
blingStart and DisablingEnd are two interface places that sig-
nal the beginning and the end of the disabling operation, re-
spectively. Such places are connected with EventOccurred 
places of events that trigger the disabling procedure, or with 
places of a Timeline model (described below). A token in place 
DisablingStart triggers the Disable activity, while a token in 
DisablingEnd re-enables the component through the Enable 
activity. 
 
Fig. 9. Disabler subnet. 
8) Timeline 
While some events occur spontaneously or as consequences 
of other events, others are known in advance, e.g., because they 
are part of the plan described in the work permit, or because 
they represent some past event that need to be included in the 
model. Such events thus follow a precise sequence and timing. 
This aspect is modeled by a Timeline subnet, which describes a 
sequence of known phases.  
 
Fig. 10. Timeline subnet. 
An example of such model is depicted in (Fig. 10). The 
completion of each phase may trigger one or more events, rep-
resented by places EventOccurredX. Those places are the inter-
face of the Timeline subnet towards the other models. In partic-
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ular, each EventX place can be connected to a Precondition of 
some EventOccurrence subnet. 
B. Model Construction 
The central idea is to automatically derive the analysis 
model from the architectural barrier description, and from the 
WP application. The process for the composition of the overall 
model consists of several steps, which are described and dis-
cussed in the following. 
Identification of barriers. The first step consists in the iden-
tification of barriers that are relevant for the WP. Barriers are 
selected based on the Kind of work, Location, and Risks fields. 
Based on this, a set of architectural models of relevant barriers, 
Bi, are retrieved. 
Events. For each event present in a barrier model Bi, an in-
stance of the EventOccurrence subnet is added to the model. If 
the occurrence rate (or probability distribution) of the event is 
known, then a timed activity is used, otherwise Event is an 
immediate activity. In case event recovery is foreseen, an Even-
tRecovery subnet is directly connected with the corresponding 
EventOccurrence subnet. 
Components. For each component present in a barrier mod-
el Bi, an instance of the GenericComponent template model is 
created. Parameters like its possible failure modes, fault occur-
rence distribution, etc., are derived from the architectural barri-
er model and the database. In case no fault occurrence infor-
mation is available for a given component, the corresponding 
FaultOccurrence activity is disabled. If the component is a 
consumable resource, then the ConsumableBarrier subnet is 
connected to the basic model. 
Error propagation. For each failure mode X of a compo-
nent A, that generates an external fault Y in component B, the 
corresponding places, FailureModeX (in the A subnet) is con-
nected to place ExternalFaultY (in the B subnet). In case some 
delay is specified for the propagation between the two compo-
nents, an instance of the EventOccurrence subnet is added be-
tween the two. That is, FailureModeX is connected to the Pre-
condition interface place, and ExternalFaultY to the Even-
tOccurred interface place. Propagation delay is given by the 
firing delay of the Event activity. 
Propagation of events. Still based on the barrier models, 
preconditions for events introduced in the previous step are set. 
In the simple case in which an event has no preconditions, a 
token is added to the corresponding Precondition place, mean-
ing that the event is always enabled. Otherwise, if the event 
requires a certain combination of conditions to hold, an in-
stance of the ConditionChecker subnet is added. The Condition 
place is shared with the Precondition place of the EventOccur-
rence. Places InputX are instead shared with the events that 
appear in the condition. 
Detection facilities. For each pair (A,E), such that compo-
nent A is marked to be able to detect event E, an instance of the 
Detector template is added to the model. The EventOccurred, 
DetectedOnTime, and DetectedLate places are shared with the 
ones corresponding to the event to detect, while Disabled, and 
FailureModeX are shared with the corresponding ones in the 
subnet of the component. 
Timeline. Timeline models are constructed based on known 
event that are going to occur during the work. In particular, the 
occurrence of safety-relevant events are considered, e.g., the 
isolation of safety mechanisms or the beginning of a different 
phase of work. 
A particular aspect that is modeled using the timeline is the 
(recent) history of repairs, and the subsequent time that has 
elapsed until the WP application. In fact, we assumed that for 
each component we know the last time at which it has been 
installed, repaired, or replaced. Basically, the last time at which 
it could be considered as new. In case we don’t have any up-
dated information on the current state of components, we must 
refer to such instant of time as their “initial state” when evalu-
ating their future behavior. The oldest repairing time, among 
those of all the components in the barrier, should then be con-
sidered as the starting point of the analysis. With properly cre-
ated Timeline models, in which events occur in correspondence 
of known repair times, and connecting EventOcurredX place 
with the DoRepair place of the corresponding component, this 
aspect can be represented and evaluated correctly. 
Isolation of safety mechanisms. The “Isolation of safety 
mechanism” field of the WP conveys the important information 
of which components are disabled during the work. For each 
event that triggers the isolation (and restore) of a safety mecha-
nism, an instance of the Disabler template is added. Places 
DisablingStart and DisablingEnd are shared with the places 
corresponding to the events that trigger the beginning or the 
end of the disabling phase. These could be, for example, Even-
tOccurredX places in the Timeline model. Place Disabled is 
connected to the Disabled place of all the components that are 
being disabled by this event. 
Concurrent work. Work that is being undertaken or is going 
to be undertaken concurrently to the WP under analysis needs 
to be taken into account during the evaluation. To this end, the 
model is extended with elements from WPs that have been 
already released, but for which work has not been completed 
yet. The same procedure as in the previous steps is repeated for 
all concurrent WPs, reusing the already introduced template 
instances for components and events, so that a unique global 
model is obtained. 
Metrics and evaluation. Metrics are specified by the archi-
tectural barrier model. Metrics that are evaluated are the union 
of the metrics specified for all the barriers that are relevant for 
the WP. These metrics are translated to reward structures, and 
evaluated at time tend, with tend being the time at which the work 
specified in the WP application is supposed to end.  
VI. CASE STUDY 
In this section we show the application of our approach to a 
real scenario devised with domain experts. 
A. The “Gas Leakage” Scenario 
One of the hazardous events that might occur during work 
on a petroleum installation is gas ignition, which may result in 
very serious damage to people and/or the infrastructure. One of 
the barriers to avoid such an event is the detection of gas leak-
age, which may be automated or manual.  
9 
We consider a generic area X, in which three gas detectors 
are operating: A, B, and C. The area can be logically divided in 
two parts, X1, where A and B are located, and X2, where C is 
located. Gas detectors A and B are located close to each other, 
and both are able to detect a gas leakage that occurs in X1, 
independently from each other. They are also able to detect a 
gas leakage occurring in X2, but only after gas concentration 
has become higher, thus only after some delay. Conversely, C 
is able to detect a gas leakage occurring in X2 in a negligible 
amount of time; it will also detect a gas leakage occurring in 
X1, but only after some delay. Gas detectors A, B and C may 
potentially be of different types and have different failure dis-
tributions. Each may fail by missing to detect the gas at all 
(omission failure) or by detecting the gas, but only after a time 
delay (late failure).  
The presented scenario is a simplification of a real barrier 
setup, which can include further details, both in the physical 
and in the cyber dimensions. For example, gas sensors can be 
decomposed into an initiator (i.e., the physical unit that senses 
the gas), and a logic solver (i.e., the device interpreting the 
data, which contains a CPU). Together they are typically con-
sidered a single Safety Instrumented Function (SIF), e.g., see 
[24].  
Gas can also be detected manually (i.e., by people on the 
rig): by smell, portable detectors, or techniques such as smear-
ing liquids on a potential leakage area and looking for bubbles. 
Gas detectors and manual gas detection form a barrier against 
the fire ignition caused by gas leakage in area X. We call this 
barrier “GasDetectionX”. 
In the scenario we use as example we consider two WP ap-
plications for work in area X: 
• WP1: The work permit under analysis. It is an applica-
tion for hot work (e.g., welding) to be performed in area 
X. 
• WP2: An already released work permit for work within 
area X. Approved work consists in the replacement of 
one of the gas sensors. This work would be performed 
in parallel with the work in WP1. 
The evaluation of WP1 proceeds according to the workflow 
in Fig. 2. The analysis of the kind of work (hot work) and of the 
location (Area X) identifies the possible risks and the associat-
ed barrier models. In our example, the model for the 
“GasDetectionX” barrier is retrieved. 
A possible representation of the architectural model of this 
barrier is sketched in Fig. 11. The model includes two events of 
interest, gas leakage in area X1, and gas leakage in area X2, 
occurring according to an exponential probability distribution 
with rate λx1 and λx2, respectively. The barrier itself is com-
posed of four components: three physical components (gas 
sensors) and one logical component, representing the manual 
detection of gas. Sensors failure distributions are exponential, 
with rate λA, λB, and λC; sensors fail in two possible failure 
modes: “late” or “omission”, with a given probability. 
The “Manual Gas Detection” component can detect both 
the events of interest. The event can be detected on time, de-
tected late, or undetected, with probability values given by pa-
rameters p_manu_ontime, p_manu_late, p_manu_undetected 
respectively. Also gas sensors can detect both events of inter-
est. Their detection probabilities are given by a combination of 
their working state (healthy, “late” failure mode, or “omission” 
failure mode) and the event to be detected. For example, if not 
failed, sensors A and B detect event X1 on time with probabil-
ity 0.9 and late with probability 0.1, while they will always 
detect event X2 late, with probability 1.0, since gas has to 
propagate across the two zones. When failed in the “omission” 
failure mode, the probability of a gas sensor to detect any event 
on time, or late is always 0. 
Metrics of interest for this barrier relate to the two events of 
interest: leakage in X1 and in X2. More in detail, for any of the 
two events E we consider: i) the probability that the event oc-
curs and it is not detected on time, pElate; ii) the probability that 
the event occurs and it is not detected at all, pEundet. 
The analysis of concurrent work identifies WP2 as a possi-
ble conflicting work, since it operates on components of the 
same barrier (gas detectors). WP2 is thus included in the analy-
sis model, in order to establish its impact on the risk-related 
metrics associated with the execution of the work in WP1.  
B. Analysis Model Construction 
The analysis model is constructed following the procedure 
in Section V.B. The “Events” step generates 2 instances of the 
EventOccurrence template, one for each of the two leakage 
events; the “Components” step generates 4 GenericComponent 
instances, one for the manual detection element, and three for 
the gas sensors. Steps “Error propagation” and “Propagation of 
events” do not generate in this case additional template in-
stances. Step “Detection facilities” generates 8 Detector in-
stances, one for each pair (component,event) such that compo-
nent is able to detect the event. The “Timeline” step generates 
4 Timeline instances, one to model the timeline of the WP, and 
the other three to model the history of the three gas sensors. 
Finally, the “Isolation of safety mechanisms” and “Current 
work” steps generate the three Disabler instances. As previous-
ly explained, all these instances are connected based on their 
interfaces. 
Fig. 11. Architectural model of the GasDetectionX barrier.
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The obtained model for the scenario of interest consists of a 
total of 21 instances of templates selected form the library in 
Section V.A: 2 EventOccurrence, 4 GenericComponent, 8 De-
tector, 4 Timeline, 3 Disabler (Fig. 12). 
C. Evaluation and Results 
The default parameters that we use for the evaluation are 
reported in Table I. For each of them, we report its default val-
ue, the source of information for determining such value, as 
well as the model template on which it applies. Some parame-
ters, like the probability of manual detection, may be difficult 
to estimate; however, it should be noted that other state-of-the 
art analysis approaches suggest to use historical data for similar 
quantities (e.g., see [6]). Current default values have been de-
vised partially on datasheets, and partially based on our own 
judgment.  
In the evaluation we have performed in this paper we tried 
to provide insights on the following main questions:  
i) How do metrics change if considering only WP1 in 
isolation, or considering both WP1 and WP2?  
ii) How do metrics change if the sensor that is disabled 
by WP2 is sensor A, B, or C?  
iii) What is the impact on metrics of variations of key pa-
rameters?  
Responding to these questions demonstrate the usefulness 
of the approach in different system conditions, as those reflect 
questions that may be raised by decision makers, or to support 
more long-term planning of work activities on an installation. 
We assume to have the following constraints to fulfill as indi-
cators of acceptable risk: i) probability of late detection should 
be below 10-4, and ii) probability of missed detection should be 
below 10-6. The model has been evaluated with the simulator 
provided with the Möbius tool [17], with at least 107 batches, a 
relative confidence half-interval of 10%, and a confidence level 
of 99%. 
Results with the nominal parameters from Table I are re-
ported in Fig. 13. Four cases are compared: the case in which 
only WP1 is considered in isolation, and the cases in which 
WP2 is included in the evaluation, each time considering a 
different sensor as the target of disconnection. Based on the 
above stated constraints, WP1 in isolation could be accepted, 
although the probability of detecting X2 late is near to the 
threshold. If considering WP2 as parallel work, WP1 can be 
accepted only if the sensor that is disconnected is A. In case the 
sensor that is going to be disconnected is C or B, a warning 
should be raised instead: in the first case, the probability of 
detecting X2 late is above the threshold; in the second case 
both the probabilities of not detecting X1 and X2 are above the 
threshold. In these cases, the request for WP1 should be reject-
ed. 
TABLE I.  PARAMETERS OF THE MODEL AND THEIR DEFAULT PARAMETERS 
Name Description Default Origin Template 
lambda_X1 Occurrence rate of gas leakage in area X1 2.5E-05 h-1 Experts / Historical Data EventOccurrence 
lambda_X2 Occurrence rate of gas leakage in area X1 2.5E-05 h-1 Experts / Historical Data EventOccurrence 
lambda_A Fault occurrence rate of sensor A 9.14E-05 h-1 Datasheets BasicComponent 
p_fail_late_A Sensor A – “late” failure mode probability 0.01 Datasheets / Database / Experts BasicComponent 
p_fail_omission_A Sensor A – “omission” failure mode probability 0.99 Datasheets / Database / Experts BasicComponent 
last_repair_A Time since last repair of sensor A 8000 h Database Timeline 
lambda_B Fault occurrence rate of sensor A 1.14E-06 h-1 Datasheets BasicComponent 
p_fail_late_B Sensor B – “late” failure mode probability 0.4 Datasheets / Database / Experts BasicComponent 
p_fail_omission_B Sensor B – “omission” failure mode probability 0.6 Datasheets / Database / Experts BasicComponent 
last_repair_B Time since last repair of sensor B 3600 h Database Timeline 
lambda_C Fault occurrence rate of sensor A 2.85E-05 h-1 Datasheets BasicComponent 
p_fail_late_C Sensor C – “late” failure mode probability 0.6 Datasheets / Database / Experts BasicComponent 
p_fail_omission_C Sensor C – “omission” failure mode probability 0.4 Datasheets / Database / Experts BasicComponent 
last_repair_C Time since last repair of sensor C 6000 h Database Timeline 
p_manu_ontime Probability of manually detecting gas leakage on time 0.0 Database / Experts Detector 
p_manu_late Probability of manually detecting gas leakage late 0.3 Database / Experts Detector 
p_manu_undetected Probability of not detecting gas leakage manually 0.7 Database / Experts Detector 
work_duration Duration of the work to be performed 12 h WP1 Timeline 
isolation_start 
Time after beginning of work in WP1 that the sensors 
would be dissconnected 
4 h WP1 & WP2 Timeline 
isolation_duration Duration of the isolation period 6 h WP1 & WP2 Timeline 




Fig. 13. Probability of not detecting gas leakage in the four 
cases – nominal parameters. 
In the following figures we evaluate the impact of varying the 
fault occurrence rate of one of the sensors, in particular Sensor 
C, on the metrics of interest for the GasDetectionX barrier. 
Results for the case in which only WP1 is considered are re-
ported in Fig. 14. In general, a higher fault occurrence rate for 
C increases the probability that one of the two events of interest 
is not detected or it is detected late. The effect is much more 
evident on the metrics for X2, since sensor C is the only one 
that is installed in area X2. However, almost for all the consid-
ered range all the constraints are fulfilled; only for λC = 
2.85E-4 or higher, the probability of detecting X2 late is slight-
ly above the threshold. 
 
Fig. 14. Probability of not detecting gas leakage at varying 
the fault occurrence rate of Sensor C, considering WP1 only. 
The case in which WP2 is executed in parallel, leading to 
the disconnection of sensor B is shown in Fig. 15. In this case, 
the impact of varying λC is much greater, and it impacts not 
only the capability of detecting a leakage in X2, but also the 
capability of detecting a leakage in X1. This is exactly due to 
the fact that B, which is one of the two sensors located in area 
X1 is going to be disabled by the parallel execution of WP2. If 
taking into account the effect of WP2, any value for λC that is 
equal or higher than 2.85E-5 violates the constraints, i.e., an 
order of magnitude lower is required with respect to consider-
ing WP1 in isolation. However, with an even lower λC, WP1 
could still be accepted even in parallel to WP2. 
Besides helping decision makers to accept or reject a work 
permit, this information can also be used to improve the barri-
ers system. If work that needs to disconnect sensor B needs to 
be executed frequently, one of the countermeasures could be 
the replacement of sensor C with one of greater quality (i.e., 
lower fault occurrence rate). 
 
Fig. 15. Probability of not detecting gas leakage at varying 
the fault occurrence rate of Sensor C, considering both WPs, 
with WP2 disabling Sensor B. 
VII. AUTOMATION AND INTEGRATION 
The analysis that we presented in this paper has been exe-
cuted manually, i.e., model templates for the gas leakage sce-
nario have been instantiated and connected manually, and then 
analyzed using the Möbius [17] tool. Automation can be per-
formed with current technology, and is being undertaken as 
part of a research project. Our plans for the implementation are 
discussed in the following. 
One of the aspects that we left as an implementation detail 
in this paper is how barriers models are actually designed by 
the domain experts, both because it can depend on the prefer-
ences of the individual company, and because there are no es-
tablished languages yet. For our realization, we will use a cus-
tom UML profile, with specific extensions to model the infor-
mation described in Section IV.B. This resulted to be the most 
convenient solution for a prototype, since in this way we can 
reuse a lot of concepts and tools that are popular in the UML 
domain. For example, we can use the popular Papyrus [20] 
diagram editor, without the need to create a specific editor or 
file format. At the same time, the domain-expert modeler will 
not need to learn a completely new language. The library of 
barriers architectural models is thus a collection of UML files. 
It should be noted however that UML is not a prerequisite of 
our approach: any custom DSL could be used instead.  
Concerning analysis models we chose, for practical rea-
sons, to store the library of SAN template models as a collec-
tion of XML files, since it is the format in which the Möbius 
tool stores the definition of SAN models. The selection of 
needed templates, generation of instances, and their composi-
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tion is a model-transformation step; as such, it is performed by 
a combination of the ATL [18] and XSLT [19] languages, 
which are transformation languages operating at model-to-
model and text-to-text levels, respectively. The final analysis of 
the composed barrier models is performed by solvers included 
in the Möbius framework. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have proposed an approach to support de-
cision makers in accepting (releasing) or rejecting work per-
mits in the petroleum domain. The support is provided by using 
state-based stochastic methods. The model of the scenario to be 
analyzed is automatically created combining together multiple 
instances of a basic template models library, based on the safe-
ty barriers of interest, the WP to be analyzed, and possible con-
current WPs that have already been released. The analysis of 
the model provides the decision makers with metrics that can 
guide them in processing the WP application objectively. We 
applied the approach to a simple but representative example of 
a gas leakage scenario, focusing on the impact of two concur-
rent WP applications.  
The work in this paper represents a first step in addressing 
the WP release problem using stochastic evaluation. To com-
pletely address this problem, several challenges still need to be 
undertaken, and they are part of our next planned steps. Evalu-
ating the models by simulation may require significant time, 
especially because the focus is on events that are supposed to 
be rare. We plan to investigate this aspect more in depth, and 
possibly resort to advanced analytical solution methods when 
possible. A longer-term activity consists in understanding if 
further information can be exploited for building the analysis 
model, and possibly extend the SAN model templates library. 
Addressing this challenge is needed but difficult, as it requires 
us to develop a deep knowledge of the information stored by 
different companies, for different kinds of installations. 
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